As late as 1997, all of these would have been
unthinkable: an embattled Suharto stepping out of office; the mega-popular
Megawati Sukarnoputri elected to the Vice-Presidency; a near-sightless Gus
Dur giving an honest apology to the MPR (Permusyawaratan Rakyat /
People's Consultative Assembly); and an independent East Timor, with the
bearded Gusmao finally savoring the victory of national resistance. Events
have so unfolded in rapid successions that Indonesians would have to pinch
themselves to remind them that all these are for real, that the
nightmarish years of the New Order are definitely over. Indeed, the lead
-up to Suharto's fall was swift, intense and dramatic; generating a new
sense of hope for once-voiceless people. But like all periods of flux,
sudden changes not only foster great expectations, they also give birth to
the grandest illusions that are sometimes fraught with dangerous
implications.
As portraits of the former strongman are pulled
one-by-one from government offices and other public places, Indonesians
are beginning to entertain the idea that post-Suharto era would finally
introduce a break in the cycle of violence and patterns of disappearances
that have occurred in the past. With sudden burst of journalistic freedom
and the proliferation of myriad political parties, the public is slowly
seeing possible indications of democracy's future realization, pointing to
these events as augury of the things that are about to come.
Pundits, however, have argued that such optimism is
quite premature, for the new government would not only have to deal with
individual acts of impunity but would have to place itself in a directly
oppositional stance against interlinking system of political control. for
disappearances under the New Order were not carried out through isolated
actions of a few poorly disciplined officers but through the network of
institutions, ideological assumptions and standard operating procedures
which underlie State response to political dissent.
Under these circumstances, one must then hasten to ask:
is there a genuine room for hope and optimism? Is there a possibility that
the current regime could finally bring the perpetrators of involuntary
disappearances and other human rights abuses to justice? Does it have the
political will and wherewithal to do so? Or will it merely succumb to
further instability thus paving the way for greater communal strife and an
increasing number of desaparecidos?
Undercurrent for Repression
For most experts, the tragedy that was Indonesia
preceded Suharto's regime, even as it dates back to the struggle for
independence against the Dutch colonizers. Since its earliest stage, the
movement for national liberation was characterized by an overt reliance on
armed resistance and extra-legal struggle. By 1942, Indonesian nationalist
gained further confidence with the easy defeat of their colonial masters
in the hands of the Japanese. Sukarno, the country's first President,
declared independence on 17 August 1945, shortly after the surrender of
Japan and the eventual victory of the Allies. The country however, would
have to wait for another four years before it could finally gain total
freedom, after the final defeat and the subsequent withdrawal of the Dutch
colonial army.
The significant role played by the newly created army
during the time of the National Revolution, gradually paved the way for
its repeated intervention in political affairs. By the 1960s, the military
was already one of the major power players in Indonesian politics; the
others being Sukarno and the three-million strong PKI (Partai Komunis
Indonesia / Indonesian communist Party). The influence of the armed
forces was first demonstrated when in 1959, under pressure from the
general staff, Sukarno was forced to disband the Constituent Assembly and
nullify the 1950 Constitution in favor of the Charter earlier adopted in
1945, a move that effectively ended Indonesia's 15-year experiment with
constitutionalism and ensured the future curtailment of human rights.
The political role of the military was given further
justification through Pancasila - the official ideology of the Indonesian
State. This was first announced by President Sukarno in a speech delivered
on June 1945 to the Investigating Committee on Indonesian Independence and
contains five fundamental principles: (1) belief in the One Supreme God;
(2) just and civilized humanity; (3) unity of Indonesia; (4) deliberative
democracy; and (5) social justice. Enshrined in the Preamble of the 1945
Constitution is Pancasila's emphasis on the attainment of "key" national
goals such as national instability, security and order, which are often
times so fundamental that any threat to them is answered by "firm
measures" through the use of state violence. Moreover, despite official
rhetoric about democracy and political openness, it is the military and
the executive department that interpret and determine national goals and
priorities. Pancasila's emphasis on stability and security is usually used
to justify the curtailment of various civil liberties and political rights
and has provided the necessary legal facade to hide abuses perpetrated by
both the police and the military.
Through the years, the State has vigorously promoted
the Pancasila through strict and rigorous ideological conformity and
conditioning. Beginning in 1978, government employees from all ranks were
required to attend an obligatory Pancasila training activity dubbed as the
"Pancasila Indoctrination Course". in 1985, Law No. 8 was passed which
required all social organizations to adopt Pancasila as their sole
determining ideology. The law also provided severe penalties against any
criticism of or deviation from the State ideology. Due to its very
stringent measures, the law initially provoked an avalanche of protest
from various religious formations and human rights groups. Some of the
protesters were eventually arrested for subversion and meted lengthy
prison terms. Due to Pancasila's all-encompassing hold on all aspects of
social life, the widely-respected Far Eastern Economic Review was prompted
to note that the Indonesian government has become highly successful in
transforming the Pancasila from its "origin as a state philosophy,
expressing national Indonesian thinking, into a compulsory state ideology,
with operative value for those who are in power."
A Tragedy Begins to Unfold
Ironically, despite the myth of the military's
preeminent role in the country's pre-independence struggle, it was Suharto
(who was once a former officer in the Dutch colonial army) who was able to
exploit the military's political function to the fullest.
From its very inception, Suharto's New Order regime was
mired in bloodshed. On the pretext of curbing an impending coup by the PKI,
military operations were launched that eventually led to a bloodbath with
the number of PKI members and sympathizers murdered between 500,000 to one
million while another one million were illegally arrested and brought into
custody. Of those who were imprisoned, only 1,000 were formally charged in
court.
The military's intervention was justified under the
dwi fungsi (dual function) concept, wherein the role of the armed
forces is not limited to national defense but also serves as the nation's
primary guarantor of stability by carrying out various political, economic
and social responsibilities.
from then on, the military has become the
foremost powerhouse in Indonesian politics, with a strong representation
in the country's two legislative bodies - the People's Consultative
Assembly (MPR) and the People's Representative Council (DPR).
Moreover, its dual function was further given legal
credence through Law No. 20 entitled "the Fundamental Law for National
Defense and Security" which took effect in September 1982. As a result,
ABRI (Angkatan Bersanjata Republik Indonesia / Armed Forces of the
Republic of Indonesia) was given carte blanche authority to stifle
dissent and to ensure national security, often without due regard to legal
formalities.
Declaring War on their Own People
In most instances, military impunity has usually been
exercised during anti-insurgency operations, most especially in regions
with strong and highly organized armed separatist movement. In Aceh for
example, situated in the northern tip of the island of Sumatra, ABRI
imposed a period of Military Operation Zone (DOM) from 1989 to 1998.
According to Support Committee for Human Rights in Aceh (SCHRA), this
highly stringent measure was responsible for the disappearance of
about 5,000 people; the killing of 3,000 others; and the rape of 128 women
and children. Aside from these, 23 mass graves were also discovered and
about 597 houses burnt. According to testimonies, these violations were
carried out by elements of the Army, the most notorious of which is the
Kopassus (army special forces) headed by Suharto's son-in-law Gen. Prabowo
Subianto.
Although the "disappearances" occurred within the
context of counter-insurgency operations, most of the victims as it turned
out, were neither members nor sympathizers of the rebel group GAM (Gerakan
Aceh Merdeka / Free Aceh movement) and disappeared while they were in
transit. In most cases, the victims were male, between 20 to 45 years old.
The situation is further aggravated by the lure of Aceh's rich natural
resources and the discovery of natural gas deposits in the Arun plain,
giving the central government in Jakarta added reason to further
consolidate its control over the region.
The lifting of the DOM, however, did not mark the end
of human rights abuses in the said region. from January to November of
last year, KontraS (Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan
/ Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence) has recorded 69
victims of disappearances, 167 cases of extra-judicial killings, 435
tortured detainees, and 312 cases of arbitrary detention.
Under the New Order, 23 cases of students
disappearances were also recorded from 1996 to 1998. Most o0f those who
resurfaced told tales of torture, intimidation and threats of punitive
action if ever they would publicly divulge their experiences with their
captors.
The military was also blamed for the highly
controversial Tanjung Priok massacre of 12 September 1984. Based on
available documentation, the bloodbath occurred after the military
provoked and shot the participants in a Koran-reading activity. In the
ensuing melee, hundreds were killed and 15 persons were reported "missing"
and unaccounted for.
Over the past ten years, an estimated 15,000 people
have already disappeared, most of them from the troubled spots of Aceh,
the former province of East Timor and former Irian Jaya. In West Papua
alone, 5 cases of extra-judicial killings were reported for the first time
11 months of the year 2000 perpetrated allegedly by the military;
including 9 cases of torture and maltreatment, and 29 individual cases of
arbitrary detention.
Old Boys Mentality
In July 1998, ABRI admitted the involvement of 11
of its men in the kidnapping and torture of opportunists. This led to
Prabowo's replacement by Gen. Muchdi Purwopranyoto as Koppasus chief. Its
head of intelligence, Col. Chairawan was also removed from his post though
he was still retained in the service. Despite the militay's admission,
ABRI spokeperson Maj. Gen. Syasmul Ma'arif sought to deodorize the guilt
of his fellow mistah by saying that what they have committed were not
heinous in nature but merely "procedural errors" in the accomplishment of
their duties. to make matters worse, the perpetrators were only given
slaps in the wrists, with a court ruling of 12 to 22 months imprisonment.
traditionally, military violators of human rights are never given harsh
punishments for their actions. Oppositionists, on the other hand, are
"normally" handed out severe penalties for even the slightest
offenses.
But such actions, however, is not an isolated case. As
proven time and again, the military tends to take care of its own members
prohibiting them to owe up to the crimes that they have committed.
It is thus no wonder that despite the fall of Suharto,
this "old boys mentality" within the military has become the biggest
stumbling block in the pursuit of justice. As long as this mindset is not
dismantled, the post-Suharto Indonesia will not be different from the
"old" New Order that it has replaced.
