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Looking Forward
‘’If the mechanisms in Thailand cannot
protect the people, perhaps the UN declaration can guarantee our
basic right. The act of enforced disappearance is an offence under
criminal law; we should stop it. No one can understand the pain of
a family who has lost a loved one under this circumstance.’’
31- Angkhana
Neelapaijit
Samak Sundaravej, head of the People Power Party
(PPP) was elected as new prime minister on 28 January 2008, “after
receiving parliamentary votes of 310 against 163 for Abhisit
Vejjejava of the Democrat Party — a choice that could put the new
government on a collision course with the generals who toppled
Thaksin for alleged corruption and abuse of power.”32
Shortly after being elected as Prime Minister,
Samak was criticized for being Thaksin’s proxy and for working under
the shadow of his predecessor. He was also labeled as reactionary
for strongly supporting the violent crackdowns on students and
pro-democracy campaigners in the 1970s and 1990s when he was still
the Deputy Minister of the Interior. Samak dismissed the allegations
as baseless and pleaded to his critics to give him a chance to do
his work.
A rumor of another coup in the offing
which surfaced in late March 2008 was causative to the growing
political instability. Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej even admitted
during an interview of hearing a ’coup buzz’’ but has not
seen the bee yet when asked about the report of the meeting of
battalion commanders at the Department of Royal Infantry 11 in
April.
Samak himself even alleged that an “invisible and
dirty hand” was conspiring to subvert the PPP’s prospects of forming
the government.33
On 10 July 2008, one of his top cabinet members resigned amid
political protests against the government’s plans to revise the
military-drafted constitution which was perceived as a scheme to
cling to power and prevent Thaksin from facing corruption- related
charges.
M. Jakrapob Penkair, who was accused of
insulting the king, said he was stepping down to end rumors of a
military coup which were prompted by the allegations.34
Many believed that the military had a hand in
Jakrapob’s resignation. It was to ensure that the government would
follow a “military-guided democracy” under the name of the King. The
Asian Centre for Human Rights Weekly Review also shared a similar
conclusion as it pointed out that:
“A military junta remains a junta even when
shabbily dressed up as a democracy. And even in the unlikely event
that the PPP is allowed to take power, the Military’s influence
will stifle any attempt at reform as it always has. Its influence
will ensure that democracy is once again probed a failure.
Thailand will slip, once again toward Military rule.”35
Although the reorganization of Samak’s cabinet is
expected to help defuse
the political tension, it also totes up to the mounting
uncertainties that are already
clouding the future of Thailand’s democracy. The weaknesses and
flaws of its
democratic system open doors of opportunity for the return of
military rule. No one can
say if the transition and the imminent political change will be
peaceful and orderly.
Thus, for Thailand’s democracy to weather the sporadic political
storms, it should
allow its established institutions to work accordingly and
effectively for the interest of
society.
Its future cannot be guaranteed unless
democratic structures are institutionalized and the democratic
process can be made more relevant to the vast majority of Thais.
The legacy of past authoritarian regimes can only be overcome by
greater popular participation and community mobilization. Civil
society and non-governmental organizations in particular, must
ensure that the state does not overstep the confines of its
powers.36
Civil society must therefore play a vital and
active role in the democratization of the Thai society. In practice,
Thai civil society already serves as a bridge of communication
between the government and the general public through interactive
dialogues. In asserting its role, it has been very active in
campaigning for the government to make policy changes and to adopt a
more productive approach and strategy to address human rights issues
particularly enforced disappearance. These policy changes can be
briefly stated in the following:
1. The suspension of the state of emergency and
the counter-insurgency campaign in the southern border provinces
of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. The military approach to armed
conflict has been found to generate more violence and human rights
abuses – killings and disappearances.
2. The peace negotiations should be given a chance to find a
peaceful and acceptable conflict resolution.
3. Strengthen the functions and powers of the
National Human Rights Commission to investigate past and present
cases of disappearance and to bring the perpetrators to court.
4. The Thai government should sign and ratify
the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance and enact legislative measures to
ensure that enforced disappearances are recognized in the penal
code as a specific offense in conformity with the international
convention.
5. The justice system should be reformed.
Department of Special Investigations under the Ministry of Justice
must be overhauled from top to bottom to make it credible and
effective. The Supreme Court must adopt resolutions that provide
better protection to civil and political rights.
6. Enforcement of clear, consistent, and
effective guidelines for the police to investigate all forms of
disappearances, whether politically motivated or connected to
trafficking and other ordinary crimes.
7. The government should respect and provide
protection for human rights
defenders.
It is now up to the Thai civil society to use the
available democratic space, however narrow it may be, to solicit
support and involvement of the people –Buddhists and Muslims alike.
For democracy to take root in Thai society, it
must be understood by the majority of people as a channel of
popular power and collective decision-making. This should be
linked to the notion of a moral state. A democratic social
understanding must see the society as a potential locus for
righteousness.37
Democracy and human rights must therefore be
anchored not only on the notion of state responsibility but also as
an individual duty and moral obligation which should conform to the
doctrine of non-violence contained in every religion – including
Buddhism and Islam. |