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COVER

Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

FOREWORD

MUGIYANTO
CHAIRPERSON, AFAD

INTRODUCTION

MARY AILEEN DIEZ BACALSO
SECRETARY GENERAL, AFAD

COUNTRY SITUATION:

CHINA
INDIA (JAMMU AND KASHMIR)
INDONESIA
NEPAL
PAKISTAN
PHILIPPINES
SRI LANKA
THAILAND

MUNIR’S CASE

AFAD’S RESPONSE

FEDEFAM’S LETTER

STATISTICS ON ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE IN ASIA:

CHINA
INDIA (JAMMU AND KASHMIR)
INDONESIA
NEPAL
PAKISTAN
PHILIPPINES
SRI LANKA
THAILAND

EPILOGUE

AFAD’S THEME SONG, DESAPARECIDOS

INDEX

BOOK WRITERS


 

Reclaiming Stolen Lives
Munir's Case

DELAYED JUSTICE: FINDING MUNIR’S MURDERERS A ND THE INDONESIAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS*  By Chang Chiu

The Investigation Formation of an Independent Investigation Team An official police investigation had begun shortly after Munir’s death and was in process while the autopsy results were being obtained. It initially interviewed 86 witnesses, including the passengers and crew of GA 974. At the conclusion of this preliminary investigation the police still had not yet declared any suspects.12 Important political figures and members of parliament began to criticize what they perceived as the slow pace of the investigation and proposed that the police complete its investigation within 100 days.13 On another front, as soon as the autopsy results became known, Munir’s family and the local human rights community also began to push for an official fact-finding team to work in parallel with the police investigation.14 The need for such a team arose in part because Munir’s murder did not appear to be an ordinary crime. Many feared that leaving the case completely in the hands of the police and conventional legal procedures would mean a repetition of past failures in addressing attacks on human rights defenders. Prior to Munir’s murder, although violence towards human rights activists frequently occurred, such acts were never properly investigated or successfully resolved in the courts with the punishment of its perpetrators.15 Another justification for an independent team was the legitimate belief that even if the police identified those directly responsible for Munir’s death, they would not have the political will to reveal the individuals ultimately behind the crime. In a positive step later marred by indecision, President Yudhoyono met with Suciwati and other human rights activists on 24 November 2004 and requested additional information about a proposed independent investigation team.16 Soon afterwards, the Indonesian human rights community quickly submitted to the government a proposal on the proposed membership and mandate of such a team. After the initial delays, public opinion and political pressure moved the Yudhoyono administration to finally agree to the formation of an independent investigation team.17 On 21 December 2004, NGOs discussed the proposal with the police, the Attorney General’s office, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. The meeting produced an agreement on the assignment, authority, and responsibilities of the team. A Presidential Decision (No. 111/2004) formally approved the independent fact-finding team,Tim Pencari Fakta, or the TPF, in late December 2004. It convened for the first time on 13 January 2005.18 The decree originally planned for the TPF’s working period to last three months. Obstacles Confront the TPF Early on, the TPF faced significant obstacles in doing its work, one of which was the TPF’s constrained mandate. According to the NGOs present at the 21 December meeting, the original agreement with the police accorded the team the authority to provide opinions to police investigators, to question witnesses and experts located within Indonesia and abroad without requiring a prior police request, to suggest a direction of inquiry and investigation to police investigators, and to monitor and evaluate its developments.19 In the December 2004 presidential decree, however, these powers were watered-down to a much weaker and more vague mandate to “assist the police.”20 The decree also omitted some prominent religious and human rights leaders who had already agreed to serve and who could have given the TPF necessary political stature to effectively conduct its mission.21 The TPF’s limited scope and curtailed membership disappointed many observers, and it appeared that the team had been set up to falter. Several proposed members declined to join the TPF, describing it as “planned to fail,” though most decided to contribute what they could with the limited mandate.22 The TPF’s final composition consisted of twelve (12) members, and included human-rights activists, legal and justice department officials, and a police brigadier. The team was chaired by Police Brigadier-General Marsudhi Hanafi and included prominent human rights figures such as Asmara Nababan, Kamala Tjandrakirana, Usman Hamid (commonly known as Usman), Rachland Nashidik, Hendardi, and Munarman. In its original three-month term, the TPF reviewed some of the police interrogation records, investigated Garuda management, visited the company responsible for closed-circuit cameras at the airport 23, and reviewed phone records, exit taxes, and money transfers. The team also worked with the Attorney General, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of Law and Human Rights to reach a legal assistance agreement with the Dutch government. This agreement facilitated the exchange of crucial information and evidence relating to the autopsy and the crime scene, including Munir’s organs, crime scene investigation results, and witness testimony. Because Dutch law prohibited the transfer of evidence to another country where the death penalty could result, the Yudhoyono government had to guarantee that any individual convicted for Munir’s murder would not be sentenced to death.24

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Garuda and Pollycarpus The TPF mainly focused on Garuda and Pollycarpus in its original threemonth period. Pollycarpus came to the attention of investigators after they discovered that he had called Munir’s phone twice the night of the flight to confirm the activist’s travel plans, and then later convinced Munir to take Pollycarpus’ seat in business class rather than Munir’s assigned seat in the coach section. Pollycarpus’ reason for being on the flight was also unclear, which quickly led to questions about the role of senior Garuda officials and any documents they may have provided that authorized his travel.25 The police investigation further discovered that Pollycarpus had met Munir previously in Jakarta and that he had obtained Munir’s mobile number several months prior to the flight.26 At the end of March 2005, on the basis of some of the TPF’s work, the police charged Pollycarpus as a suspect in Munir’s murder. Specifically, the police stated that Pollycarpus had given false testimony that indicated he had some involvement in the crime. The actual charges brought by the government were related to premeditated murder and secondary charges of falsifying documents.27 Garuda initially proved uncooperative.28 Despite three weeks’ notice, Garuda officials cancelled a reconstruction of the crime planned for 22 January at the last minute, claiming that they were not prepared to provide the plane and crew involved in GA 974.29 The exercise, a standard step in Indonesian police investigations, was postponed a second time on 1 March. TPF chair Hanafi told the press that the Garuda officials were quite defensive and appeared to be involved in a cover up.30 The reconstruction was critical for revealing more about how the arsenic might have been applied to the food and drink that Munir consumed the night of 6 September. The TPF did manage to uncover three key documents that had enabled Pollycarpus’ presence on the plane and were inconsistent with Garuda’s normal procedures. The documents are referred to as the: 11 August assignment letter, the backdated 4 September memo, and the 6 September Notice of Change. • 11 August assignment letter: This letter, signed by Garuda Managing Director Indra Setiawan, named Pollycarpus as “assisting staff” with the assignment “to recommend solution to problems at Garuda, especially in Aviation and Internal Security.” Significantly, this document was cited in all other documents connected with the trip and provided a basis for Pollycarpus to be at the scene of the crime. The letter was suspicious for a variety of reasons. The letter was signed close to the time that Munir’s plan to go abroad appeared in press reports. In addition, it was unprecedented for the Managing Director to issue such a letter directly to a pilot. Typically, appropriate subordinates issued such letters. • The backdated September 4 memo: This interoffice memo was signed by Vice-President for Security Ramelgia Anwar and dated 4 September 2004. It cited the 11 August letter and requested that the Chief Pilot allow Pollycarpus to fly as nonactive crew from Jakarta to Surabaya, Denpasar, or Singapore. It was later determined that the letter was written on September 15 and was backdated to September 4, a Saturday on which the office was closed. Pollycarpus requested Anwar to write this letter after the Chief Pilot asked Pollycarpus about his expenses for his trip to Singapore.31 Existence of this letter and its backdating demonstrated that certain Garuda officials sought to authorize Pollycarpus’ presence on GA 974 after the murder had occurred. • 6 September Notice of Change: On the day of his travel, the basis for Pollycarpus’ presence on GA 974 was the signature of Flight Operation Support Officer, Rohainil Aini. This notice changed Pollycarpus’ work schedule and permitted him to take GA 974 and return the following morning. This sort of assignment usually requires the permission of the more senior Chief of Pilots and allowing a lower-level official such as Aini to provide the notice was unprecedented. Details emerged that Pollycarpus had met Aini shortly before Garuda headquarters closed on 6 September in order to receive authorization to fly on GA 974 later that evening. Another suspicious issue was that Pollycarpus’ supposed security assignment was unusual given his lack of qualifications in this field.32 Setiawan stepped down after the TPF urged that he be investigated for his role in providing Pollycarpus with documents. The two other officials tied to the documents, Aini and Anwar, as well as flight crew with roles in preparing food and drink on GA 974, were summoned by the police for questioning in March. These senior officials were mentioned in the original document forgery charges against Pollycarpus, but only Setiawan and Aini were charged in connection with the case much later in the fall of 2007. BIN Resistance In March 2005, the TPF received a three-month extension from the Yudhoyono government in order to explore BIN’s role in Munir’s murder. During the original working period of the TPF, mysterious anonymous SMS messages had circulated in Indonesia claiming that Pollycarpus had strong ties to BIN.33 In mid-March 2005, the TPF received information from undisclosed sources pointing to suspicions that intelligence officials had been involved in the plan to assassinate Munir. Usman thought that the information was too important to be ignored, but not easily confirmable.34 The TPF needed additional time in order to check the accuracy of the information, which would require a thorough investigation of BIN.

Bottom

The primary evidence of a link between Pollycarpus and BIN was a series of phone calls, at least 35 according to press accounts, made between both Pollycarpus ’home and cellphone  and an office phone and cellphone linked to a man named H. Muchdi Purwopranjono (known widely as Muchdi). Many of these calls occurred in the days just before and after Munir’s murder, as well as in the days after the police announced an investigation. In addition, these calls were made both before and after Munir’s murder. Muchdi was a career soldier who had moved to BIN in 2001. Interestingly, one of his last military positions was as head of the Kopassus in 1998, a time of intense power struggles and human rights abuses,including the disappearances of numerous pro-democracy activists. As mentioned previously, Munir founded KontraS as a response to these disappearances, and his investigations specifically linking the disappearance of several university activists in 1997 to Kopassus contributed to Muchdi losing his job soon after. Clearly, Muchdi could harbor a motive for killing Munir, the man primarily responsible for ending his rising military career.35 Muchdi disavowed all knowledge of Pollycarpus and claimed his cell phone had been used by someone else.36 Pollycarpus’ travels to conflict areas provided a further indication of possible BIN links. Travel documents provided to the TPF reportedly showed that Pollycarpus flew to Aceh for a week just as martial law was declared in March 2003. While in Aceh, Pollycarpus traveled with a BIN agent named Bambang Irwan.37 Several journalists also recalled seeing him in North Aceh at the time. Pollycarpus had previously stated that he was in East Timor at the time of the referendum and the mass expulsion that followed, and he is also known to have spent time in Papua. His lawyers confirmed his presence in these conflict areas, but contend that in each case he was doing humanitarian work.38 A chief obstacle to the TPF’s investigation of BIN was the lack of a working mechanism or agreement to ensure access to BIN officials and documents. While police officials stated that they also intended to interview BIN officials, and the head of the BIN publicly stated that his agency was ready to cooperate with the investigation, this cooperation did not materialize during the TPF’s mandate.39 These delays arose even though an official agreement had been negotiated after much effort between BIN, the Yudhoyono government, and the TPF on 2 May 2005. In the protocol, BIN agreed to cooperate with the TPF in compiling information and documents, and to grant the TPF access to conduct document research and compile information relevant to Munir’s death. Both sides had pledged mutual respect for the other party’s work and authority, as well as for the law.40 While the May 2 protocol resulted in interviews with lower-ranking intelligence officials, it never produced the results the TPF hoped for. One member of the TPFstated that not a single document had been given to the TPF by BIN.41 There are strong indications that the head of BIN specifically ordered his staff not to show or give any documents to the TPF.42 Over the course of time, BIN delayed multiple meetings between its officials and the TPF.43 In many cases, past and present BIN officials did not entirely reject meetings outright, but appeared to use delaying tactics to avoid providing information to the TPF. Muchdi, Hendropriyono, and Irawan each negotiated appearances before the TPF and then skipped appointments due to missed planes, unexpected travel, or other excuses. The intelligence officials stonewalled the investigation until the TPF’s mandate expired on23 June 2005.44 The inner workings of BIN made it essential to question current and former senior officials such as Muchdi and Hendropriyono. The BIN strategy of compartmentalization meant that “non-organic” agents – those recruited from outside the agency – were known only to their handlers. At that stage of the TPF investigation, it was believed that no formal assignment letter or other paperwork documented the acitivities of BIN agents, who may have been registered by their code names or not at all. It was the responsibility of deputies, such as Muchdi, to monitor their activities. Pollycarpus may have been such an agent, as the head of BIN had previously denied any documentation appointing him as a BIN agent. (During a later stage of the police investigation, after the TPF had ceased its activities, the police discovered a computer file with the names and telephone numbers of people serving within the intelligence network. This file included information about Pollycarpus’.)45 On June 14, the TPF disclosed that they had uncovered documents revealing three credible scenarios to kill Munir, including one by assassinating him in a car. Two other methods both involved poisoning. (A fourth plot had involved using ‘black magic’, a tactic based upon traditional Indonesian beliefs.) The poisoning plot prior to GA 974 allegedly failed. On the day his food was to be poisoned at KontraS, Munir did not go to work.46 The TPF did not include these documents in its final report because they were already in the possession of President Yudhoyono. Also, BIN’s refusal to cooperate made it difficult to interpret or confirm their authenticity.47 BIN officials denied that Munir was ever targeted for attack, but acknowledged that he was a target of “indirect” BIN pressure. They noted that on several occasions senior human rights figures were asked to tell Munir to be less vocal, but that he had failed to tone down his criticism of the government.48 The TPF found that Munir had angered BIN officials through his work on democratization and human rights, including his criticism of a draft intelligence bill that would expand the agency’s power.49 Munir had also helped to bring a lawsuit against President Megawati Sukarnoputri for appointing Hendropriyono to head BIN in 2001 despite his human rights record.50 Police Failures The TPF was designed to work in conjunction with the official police investigation. However, doubts about the capacity or will of the police to solve the case proved well-founded. The police made little initial headway in the early months in building the case against Pollycarpus, let alone the alleged masterminds of the plot. Although the police had taken some early action by conducting interviews, the transcripts from these interviews were often brief and insubstantial. Sometimes, the police did not give the transcripts to the TPF. For example, the TPF received less than 20 of the 100 witness interview transcripts. However the police did show some improvement due to the TPF’s efforts. After the TPF found links to Garuda and BIN, police interviewed officials from both institutions. The TPF concluded that the police were unwilling to fully investigate and recommended an audit of the police investigation team. This conclusion was based on several weaknesses in the police team’s work: • Poor technical capacity on aviation, aviation security, and forensic analysis; • Inadequate independence from the police bureaucracy, leading to slow decision-making; • Poor coordination with other ministries and agencies as seen in the delays in securing a mutual legal assistance agreement with the Dutch government; • Failure to share information; and • Failure to follow up on the TPF recommendations to the police team, such as in-depth investigation of Garuda officials, and an investigation of Pollycarpus’s activities in Singapore.51

Notes: 12 “State is Responsible for Munir’s Case.” (2004, November 28). Republika; “Polri Evaluated Results of Witnesses’ Examinations in Munir’s Case.”(2004, December 7). Retrieved from www.detik.com 13 “SBY Is Asked to Resolve the Case of Munir’s Death.” (2005, January 4). Retrieved from www.mediaindo.co.id; “DPR Targets Munir’s Case to Finish in Three Months.” (2005, January 5). Retrieved from www.mediaindo.co.id; “DPR Urges Polri to Set Time Limit to Investigate Munir’s Case.” (2005, January 18).Tempoempo. 14 See Joint Press Release in KontraS, 12 November 2004, on behalf of Suciwati, Todung Mulya Lubis, Rachland Nashidik and Usman Hamid. 15 Usman Hamid, 19 November 2004 press conference. 16 “President Asks for Basic Concept of Munir Investigation Team.” (2004, November 2004). Kompas. 17 “Human Rights Activists Demand President to Form Independent Investigation Team on Munir,” Kompas, 3 December 2004; “Mallarangeng: Independent Team Not Appropriate Yet,” Indopos, 9 December 2004; “SBY Reneges on Promise to Munir’s Widow,” Jakarta Post, 9 December 2004; “Investigation Team for Munir’s Case Cancelled,” Koran Tempo, 8 December 2004. 18 “Susilo Gives Christmas ‘Gifts’ to Papua, Munir’s Family,” Jakarta Post, 24 December 2004. 19 “KontraS: Tim Investigasi Munir Kurang Sempurna,” Kompas CyberMedia, 24 December 2004; Diharapkan Mampu Tembus ‘Tembok’,” Kompas, 22 December 2004. 20 In fairness, the decree also calls on all government agencies to provide help to the team as needed. The decree stated, “In carrying out its task, the team is to obtain all assistance needed from all agencies of the central or local government and other parties as needed.” 21 These individuals included Syafii Ma’arif, Sinta Nuriyah Abdurrahman Wahid, and Todung Mulya Lubis. “Syafii Ready to Join Team Munir,” Koran Tempo, 26 November 2004. 22 To replace the three who declined, I Putu Kasa, Smita Notosusanto and Bambang Widjojanto, a later decree named Domu P. Sihite, Tini Haddad, and Amiruddin Al Rahab. After the team finished its work in June, Sihite later joined the prosecution team in the trial of Pollycarpus; “Munir’s Assassination Must Be Resolved Thoroughly,” Kompas, 31 December 2004. 23 A review of the CCTV operators uncovered that as of September 2004, Soekarno-Hatta airport only had two cameras that monitored 600 points within the airport. These two cameras used old video technology that could not automatically record incidents in the airport. Unfortunately, Munir’s presence at the airport was not captured by the cameras “TPF Munir Asked Polri to Examine 2 Airport CCTV Operators,” www.detik.com, 15 February 2005. 24 “Dutch Opposition Submit Motion about Munir,” Suara Pembaruan, 2 December 2004; “Polri Will Crosscheck Munir’s Documents from the Netherlands,” www.detik.com, 1 April 2005. 25 Human Rights First White Paper, p. 3. 26 “Polly Examined by Police, Answers Allegation Related to Intelligence,” Indopos, Thursday, 2 December 2004. 27 “Pollycarpus Still Hides Executors of Munir’s Murder,” www.detik.com, 21 March 2005. 28 See Human Rights First, “Indonesian Airline Not Cooperating with Investigation of Activist’s Death,” Media Alert, 3 March 2005. 29 “Pre-reconstruction in Munir’s Case Postponed Until March,” Tempo, 23 February 2005. 30 “Team questions Garuda’s commitment in Munir probe,” Jakarta Post, 1 March 2005. 31 Human Rights First White Paper, p.11. 32 Surat Dakwaan, No. Reg Perkara PDM-1305/JKT.PST/07/2005, 27 July 2005, p. 7; “TPF: Three Garuda Officials Conspired to Poison Munir,” www.detik.com, 3 March 2005. 33 “Polri Headquarters: No Evidence Yet on BIN Officials’ Involvement in Munir’s Case,” www.detik.com, 1 February 2005; “SMS Circulating about Pollycarpus Recruited by BIN as a main Intelligence Agent,” www.detik.com, 1 February 2005. 34 “TPF Munir Asked to Check Information on BIN Members’ Involvement,” www.detik.com, 17 March 2005. 35 “Django goes to jail” Tempo, 24-30 June 2008. 36 “Munir Bukan Target Operasi BIN,” Ekspos, June 2005, Edition 01/1, p. 11. 37 “Polri Periksa Eks Perwira Kopassus Pekan Ini Soal Munir,” www.detik.com, May 30, 2005. 38 KontraS, “Monitoring Persidangan Pembunuhan Munir IV,” undated. 39 “Chief of Police: No Problems Examining Intelligence on Munir’s Case,” www.detik.com, 24 March 2005; “Police Won’t Hesitate to Examine BIN,” www.kompascyber.com, 24 March 2005 40 “TPF, BIN Teken Kerja Sama Ungkap Kasus Munir,” Media Indonesia, 3 May 2005. 41 Human Rights First interview with TPF member Asmara Nababan, 16 August 2005. 42 “Kepala BIN Larang Buka Akses untuk TPF Munir,” www.detik.com, 15 June 2005. 43 “Munir TPF Sends Second Invitation to Chief of BIN,” www.detik.com, 31 March 2005; “Munir TPF Again Schedules Meeting With Chief of BIN,” Media Indonesia, 2 April 2005. 44 Hendropriyono was invited to appear on three occasions, Muchdi four times, and Irawan twice, all without results. See for example, “Muchdi PR Tak Penuhi Panggilan TPF Munir,” www.detik.com, 2 June 2005; “Hendro Belum Nongol, Pengacaranya Tiba di Kantor TPF,” www.detik.com, 6 June 2005. Hendropriyono also invited the TPF to come to him on June 15, and held a press conference when they did not “Hendro Kecewa Berat TPF Tidak Hadiri Undangannya,” www.detik.com, 15 June 2005. The three were eventually questioned by police investigators, though the interviews and results were closely guarded. 45 “Tracking down Pak Michael,” Tempo, 17-23 June 2008. 46 Eva C. Komandjaja and Tiarma Siboro, “The Plot Thickens: Documents Reveal Four Plans to Kill Munir,” Jakarta Post, 15 June 2005; “Team Finds Conspiracy behind Indonesian Rights Activist’s Death,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 14 June 2005. 47 Human Rights First interview, 6 September 2005. 48 Human Rights First interview with Asmara Nababan, 16 August 2005. 49 Ibid. 50 Hendropriyono was intelligence chief from 2001 to 2004, after a long career in the military. As a colonel, his role in a 1989 massacre of villagers earned him the nickname “the Butcher of Lampung.” Munir represented the victims in this 1989 massacre. As Minister for Transmigration and Resettlement Hendropriyono is thought to have played a key role in funding and organizing both the East Timorese militias and the forced population transfer into West Timor after the 1999 referendum. Munir also served on a government sponsored commission that had heavily criticized Hendropriyono’s actions in East Timor; see also “Polly, BIN Officials Had Contact,” Media Indonesia, 19 May 2005. 51 Human Rights First interview with TPF member Asmara Nababan, 16 August 16, 2005.

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